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Highlights 
 An exploration framework for identifying CPS vulnerabilities to cyber threats is proposed. 
 Cyber attack scenarios are explored by Monte Carlo sampling. 
 A safety margin estimation approach is proposed for cyber threat prioritization. 
 The framework is illustrated with respect to the digital I&C system of an ALFRED 
simulator. 
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A MONTE CARLO-BASED EXPLORATION FRAMEWORK FOR 
IDENTIFYING COMPONENTS VULNERABLE TO CYBER THREATS IN 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS  
Wei Wang1, Antonio Cammi1, Francesco Di Maio1, Stefano Lorenzi1, Enrico Zio1,2 
1
Energy Department, Politecnico di Milano, Via La Masa 34, 20156 Milano, Italy 
2
Chair on System Science and the Energy Challenge, Fondation Electricite’ de France (EDF), 
CentraleSupélec, Université Paris Saclay, 91190 Gif-sur-Yvette, France 
 
Abstract: With the extensive use of digital Instrumentation and Control (I&C) 
systems, Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) are becoming Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). 
Their integrity can, then, be compromised also by security breaches (such as cyber 
attacks). Multiple failure modes (such as bias, drift and freezing) can occur, both due 
to random failures or induced by malicious external attacks. In this paper, we illustrate 
an exploration approach that, based on safety margins estimation, allows identifying 
the most vulnerable components to malicious external attacks. For demonstration, we 
apply the approach to the Advanced Lead-cooled Fast Reactor European 
Demonstrator (ALFRED). Its object-oriented model is embedded within a Monte 
Carlo (MC)-driven engine that injects different types of cyber attacks at random times 
and magnitudes. Safety margins are, then, calculated and used for identifying the most 
vulnerable CPS components. This allows selecting protections to make ALFRED 
resilient towards maliciously induced failures. 
 
Keywords: Nuclear Power Plant; Cyber-Physical System; Cyber Threats; Safety 
Margins; Advanced Lead-cooled Fast Reactor European Demonstrator (ALFRED). 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
ALFRED Advanced Lead-cooled Fast Reactor European Demonstrator 
CPS Cyber-Physical System 
CR Control Rod 
DoS Denial of Service 
FA Fuel Assemblies 
I&C Instrumentation and Control 
MC Monte Carlo 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
OS Order Statistics 
PI Proportional-Integral 
SG Steam Generator 
SISO Single Input Single Output 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
PTh Thermal power 
hCR Height of control rods 
TL,hot Coolant core outlet temperature 
TL,cold Coolant SG outlet temperature 
Г Coolant mass flow rate 
Tfeed Feedwater SG inlet temperature 
Tsteam Steam SG outlet temperature 
pSG SG pressure 
Gwater Feedwater mass flow rate 
Gatt Attemperator mass flow rate 
kv Turbine admission valve coefficient 
PMech Mechanical power 
Kp Proportional gain 
Ki Integral gain 
Kp,ref Reference value of proportional gain 
Ki,ref Reference value of integral gain 
t Time 
tA Attack time 
tM Mission time 
Δt Sensor measuring time interval 
y Variable (safety parameter) 
y(t) Real value of y 
yset,ref Reference value of controllers set point value of y 
yset Controller set point value of y under cyber attack 
e(t) Residual between y(t) and yset 
Ly Lower threshold of y 
Ry Reference value of y 
Uy Upper threshold of y 
ysensor(t) Sensor real measurement at t 
δ(t) Sensor measuring errors 
a Accidental scenario 
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N Number of samples of a 
max,ay  Maximum value of y during an accidental scenario a 
1
max,ay
  
Specific γ1 percentile of the distribution of the measured maximum 
values of y 
1
max,ay  First element of N samples sorted in descending order 
1 1,
max,ˆ ay
  Estimated 1max,ay
  with confidence β1 
min,ay  Minimum value of y during a 
2
min,ay
  
Specific γ2 percentile of the distribution of the measured minimum 
values of y 
2 2,
min,
ˆ
ay
   Estimated 2
min,ay
  with confidence β2 
, aU y
M  Safety margin of y with respect to Uy 
1 1,
, aU y
M
   
Safety margin of y with respect to Uy, given with confidence β1 on 
the percentile γ1 
2 2,
, aL y
M
   
Safety margin of y with respect to Ly, given with confidence β2 on 
the percentile γ2 
1 2, ,
, aT y
M
    
Safety margin of y with respect to both Uy and Ly, given with 
confidence β for percentiles γ1 and γ2 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Hazards and threats are major concerns for the safety and security of modern 
industry (Aven, 2016; Aven and Krohn, 2014; Zio, 2016; Kriaa et al., 2015; Piètre-
Cambacédès and Bouissou, 2013). The accidents that may originate can be prevented 
only if they are known in advance, at least to some extent (Paté-Cornell, 2002; Paté-
Cornell, 2012). 
Modeling and simulation can be used to explore and understand the behavior of a 
system, under different, possibly uncertain conditions, including hazardous ones 
(Turati et al., 2017a; Turati et al., 2017b). Design-Of-Experiment (DOE) approaches 
have been proposed to study different operating conditions, in order to analyze the 
corresponding system responses with respect to specified performance criteria: safety, 
reliability, resilience, business continuity, etc. (Santner et al., 2013; Simpson et al., 
2001; Zeng & Zio, 2017). One outcome of the analysis, which is of particular interest, 
is the identification of the conditions (represented by factors, parameters and variables 
values) that lead the system to critical conditions of failure (Zio and Di Maio, 2009; 
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Zio, 2016; Turati et al., 2017a; Ntalampiras, 2016). 
In this paper, we consider Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). A CPS features a 
tight combination of (and coordination between) the system computational units and 
physical elements. The integration of computational resources into physical processes 
is aimed at adding new capabilities to stand-alone physical systems and realize 
functionalities of real-time monitoring, dynamic control and decision support during 
normal operation as well as in case of accidents. In CPSs, cyber and physical 
processes are dependent and interact with each other through feedback control loops 
(e.g., embedded cyber controllers monitor and control the system physical variables, 
whilst physical processes affect, at the same time, the monitoring system and the 
computation units by wired or wireless networks (Kim and Kumar, 2012; Lee, 2008)). 
The benefit of such self-adaptive capability is the reason why CPSs are increasingly 
operated in transportation, energy, medical and health-care, and other applications 
(Lee, 2008; Khaitan and McCalley, 2015; Bradley and Atkins, 2015). 
In the context of nuclear energy, the introduction of digital Instrumentation and 
Control (I&C) systems allows Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) to take advantage of the 
new technologies in the field (IAEA, 2009). Cyber controllers have been shown to 
benefit from the use of information related to: (1) environmental conditions (which 
play an important role in affecting the system dynamics, and should be measured and 
adaptively integrated into the cyber real-time monitoring and control in an intelligent 
manner (Wang et al., 2017a)); (2) periodically updated values of parameters (for 
keeping up-to-date the CPS settings (Liu et al., 2014)); (3) new interaction modalities 
between human and system user interfaces (leading to more flexible system 
operability from the human perspective (Paelke and Röcker, 2015)); and (4) 
computer-based networks status (to enhance the network connectivity and remote 
control, communicate with sensing data, and coordinate over constrained 
environments (Ali et al., 2015)). 
Cyber threats, initiated in the cyber domain and manifested in the physical 
domain, can be misclassified as component failures, disguising their malicious 
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character (Zalewski et al., 2016; Rahman et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2018). Even if they 
are different from components stochastic failures, they can lead to similar 
consequences on the system physical processes (e.g., both a stochastic failure and a 
cyber attack can result in sensor performance degradation (Rahman et al., 2016)). 
From the perspective of security analysis, the identification of the cyber threats 
most affecting the system response is quite important for decision-making on optimal 
protection (Fang and Sansavini, 2017; Hu et al., 2017). 
Other works have focused on the formulation and modeling of malicious 
activities to CPSs (Kriaa et al., 2015; Xiang et al., 2017; Pasqualetti et al., 2013). 
Besides graphical methods (such as attack graphs (McQueen et al., 2006; Sheyner and 
Wing, 2003; Ingols et al., 2006), attack trees (Schneier, 1999; Fovino et al., 2009), 
Petri nets (Mitchell and Chen, 2013)), mathematical models (such as those based on 
game theory (Backhaus et al., 2013; Xiang et al., 2018) and attacker-defender models 
(Fang et al., 2017; Yuan et al., 2014)), cyber attacks have also been simulated (Huang 
et al., 2009; Rahman et al., 2016; Khalid and Peng, 2016). 
In particular, Monte Carlo (MC) simulation allows considering the interactions 
among the physical parameters of the process (e.g., temperature, pressure, flow rate, 
etc.), human actions, components stochastic failures, and malicious activities (Zio, 
2013; Wang et al., 2017b). Attacks aiming at damaging different components of the 
CPSs can, thus, be explored, generating different scenarios in the physical domain 
which lead to different consequences (e.g., magnitude of failure). Similarly, models 
can be introduced for describing attack magnitudes and the attackers’ 
adaptive/responsive behaviors, generating and exploring specific deviations caused by 
cyber attacks.  
Specifically, in this work, we develop a general modelling and simulation 
framework for generating cyber attack scenarios by MC sampling, testing their effects 
on CPS integrity and prioritizing the most vulnerable components of the CPS. An 
approach is originally undertaken for processing cyber attack scenarios, based on the 
related estimated safety margin, the most vulnerable components are identified. 
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A number of non-parametric statistical methods have been used in safety analysis 
for safety margin estimation: the Wilk’s method based on Order Statistics (OS) 
(Wilks, 1941; Wilks, 1942; Wald, 1943; Nutt and Wallis, 2004), Beran and Hall 
simple linear interpolation (Beran and Hall, 1993), Hutson fractional statistics 
(Hutson, 1999) and data-based bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1986). 
Among these, OS is popular and consolidated because it provides relatively 
conservative results with a few computer code runs, for leveraging the usually 
expensive computational cost of simulation codes (Nutt and Wallis, 2004; Zio et al., 
2010; Sanchez-Saez et al., 2017). In this study, we, thus, take a “Bracketing” OS 
approach for tackling the computational problem and calculating the safety margins 
(Nutt and Wallis, 2004; Di Maio et al., 2016a; Di Maio et al., 2016b; Di Maio et al., 
2017).  
Without loss of generality and for demonstration purposes, the proposed 
approach is illustrated with respect to cyber attack scenarios injected into a specific 
nuclear CPS, namely, the digital I&C system of the pool-type Advanced Lead Fast 
Reactor European Demonstrator (ALFRED) (Alemberti et al., 2013), whose 
previously developed object-oriented DYMOLA simulator (Ponciroli et al., 2014; 
Ponciroli et al., 2015) with a multi-loop PI control scheme (Skogestad and 
Postlethwaite, 2007) is utilized. Cyber attacks to the components of the digital I&C 
system are injected into the ALFRED simulator by MC sampling of four important 
safety parameters: turbine inlet steam temperature, Steam Generator (SG) pressure, 
lead temperature at the SG outlet (the “cold leg” temperature) and thermal power. For 
simplicity, but without loss of generality, no protection is taken into account, i.e., the 
control system for the normal operation mode remains in operation during (and after) 
the cyber attack. This is, thus, a “worst-case” condition, since the protections to 
prevent or mitigate unwanted consequences are not considered. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main characteristics of 
the ALFRED reactor, with its control scheme at full power nominal conditions, and 
the MC engine of cyber breaches injection for generating cyber attack scenarios. In 
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Section 3, safety margins are quantified with respect to sensors, actuators and 
controllers failure modes. Identification of the components most vulnerable to cyber 
attacks is illustrated in Section 4. In Section 5, conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. THE ADVANCED LEAD-COOLED FAST REACTOR EUROPEAN 
DEMONSTRATOR 
The ALFRED reactor with its full power mode control scheme and the MC 
engine of cyber breaches injection are described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. 
 
2.1 ALFRED Description 
ALFRED is a small-size (300 MW) pool-type LFR, whose primary system 
configuration is shown in Fig. 1 (Alemberti et al., 2013). The ALFRED core is 
composed by wrapped Fuel Assemblies (FAs) for providing the thermal power PTh, 
and Control Rods (CRs) systems adjust the heights of CRs hCR for power regulation 
and reactivity swing compensation. 
At full power nominal conditions, the coolant (i.e., lead) flow coming from the 
cold pool enters the core at temperature TL,cold  equal to 400 
oC and, once passed 
through the core, it is collected in the volume of the hot collector at temperature TL,hot 
equal to 480 oC; from there, it is delivered to eight Steam Generators (SGs). After 
leaving the SGs, the coolant enters the cold pool through the cold leg and returns to 
the core.  
The eight SGs work at pressure pSG equal to 180 bar. The feedwater of the 
secondary cooling system flows in the SGs, at pressure pSG and temperature Tfeed 
equal to 335 oC, and leaves the SGs after absorbing heat from the primary coolant, 
entering the turbine as steam at temperature Tsteam equal to 450 
oC. From a control 
point of view, it is worth noticing that the steam mass flow rate is considered 
proportional to the inlet pressure and governed by maneuvering the turbine valve 
admission (kv). An attemperator is foreseen between the SG outlet header and the 
turbine, to limit the steam temperature at the turbine inlet Tsteam, keeping it as close as 
possible to its nominal value, by adjusting the attemperator mass flow rate Gatt. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
9 
 
Eventually, ALFRED produces mechanical power PMech to be transformed for the 
power grid. 
 
 
Fig. 1. ALFRED primary system layout (Alemberti et al., 2013) 
 
A simplified schematics of the ALFRED primary and secondary cooling systems 
is shown in Fig. 2. The input data of the ALFRED model are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 ALFRED parameters values, at full power nominal conditions 
Parameter Parameter Description Value Unit 
PTh Thermal power 300·10
6
 W 
hCR Height of control rods 12.3 cm 
TL,hot Coolant core outlet temperature 480 
oC 
TL,cold Coolant SG outlet temperature 400 
oC 
Г Coolant mass flow rate 25984 kg·s
-1
 
Tfeed Feedwater SG inlet temperature 335 
oC 
Tsteam Steam SG outlet temperature 450 
oC 
pSG SG pressure 180·10
5
 Pa 
Gwater Feedwater mass flow rate 192 kg·s
-1
 
Gatt Attemperator mass flow rate 0.5 kg·s
-1
 
kv Turbine admission valve coefficient 1 - 
PMech Mechanical power 146·10
6
 W 
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Condenser
Turbine
TL,cold
TL,hot
Gwater
kv
hCR pSG
PTh
Tsteam
Water Pump
Attemperator
Gatt
Core
Steam 
Generator
Header
Tfeed
Turbine Admission 
Valve
PMech
 
Fig. 2. ALFRED simplified schematics 
 
2.2 Reactor Control Scheme 
To design the regulators and simulate the system controlled response, an object-
oriented simulator of the entire plant has been developed (Fig. 3), based on the 
Modelica language (Fritzson, 2010) and implemented in the Dymola environment 
(DYMOLA, 2015) (for details, see Ponciroli et al., 2014; Ponciroli et al., 2015). 
Both feedback and feedforward digital control schemes are adopted for ALFRED 
(see Fig. 3 shadowed part). The PI-based feedback control configuration employs four 
SISO (Single Input Single Output) control loops independent of each other (Ponciroli 
et al., 2015). The parameters of the PI regulators have been calibrated and are reported 
in Table 2. 
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Note:               - Sensor
Condenser
Turbine
TL,cold
TL,hot
Gwater
kvhCR pSG
PTh
Tsteam
Water Pump
Attemperator
GattCore
Steam 
Generator
Header
Control System
Tsteam
pSG
TL,cold
PTh
kv
Gatt
Gwater
hCR
PI1
PI2
PI3
PI4
Tfeed
Feedforward
Turbine Admission Valve
Control Rods
PMech
Physical System
 
Fig. 3. ALFRED reactor control scheme 
 
Table 2 Parameters of PI controllers  
PI 
Control Loop Controller Parameters 
Controlled variable Control variable Kp,ref Ki,ref 
PI1 Tsteam (
oC) Gatt (kg·s
-1) 1·10-1 5·10-2 
PI2 pSG (Pa) kv (-) 3·10
-7
 1·10-8 
PI3 TL,cold (
oC) Gwater (kg·s
-1) 6·10-1 1·10-2 
PI4 PTh (W) hCR (cm) 2·10
-11
 4·10-11 
 
The control aims at keeping the controlled variables of the control loops 
approximately at the steady state values, for outputting a steady mechanical power. 
The values represent the optimal working conditions of the system at full power 
nominal conditions. The regulation of the controlled variables is of particular concern, 
to bring benefits to the structural materials and ensure safe NPP operation conditions. 
Safety thresholds for each variable, listed in Table 3, are set such that consequences of 
transients and accidents are limited: for example, the TL,cold must be kept above 350
oC 
to avoid the embrittlement of the structural materials in aggressive environments 
enhanced by the fast neutron irradiation.  
In Fig. 4, profiles of the controlled variables, with a mission time tM equal to 
3000s, are shown. Under the control scheme of Fig. 3, the values of the variables are 
kept approximately at their nominal values, at full power nominal conditions, despite 
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the measuring errors (white noise). 
 
Table 3 List of reference and threshold values for safety variables 
Variable, y 
Reference value, Ry, at full 
power nominal conditions 
Safety thresholds 
Lower, Ly Upper, Uy 
Tsteam (
oC) 450 - 550 
pSG (Pa) 180·10
5
 170·105 190·105 
TL,cold (
oC) 400 350 - 
PTh (W) 300·10
6
 270·106 330·106 
 
 
Fig. 4. Profiles of the controlled variables of the ALFRED model at full power nominal 
conditions: (a) Steam SG outlet temperature; (b) SG pressure; (c) Coolant SG outlet temperature; 
and (d) Thermal power 
 
2.3 The Monte Carlo Engine of Cyber Breaches Injection  
To test the effects of cyber attacks on system integrity, a MC engine is integrated 
with the ALFRED model for injecting cyber breaches at random times and 
magnitudes. It shall be noted that, the random time tA of the attack occurrence only 
plays an illustrative role in modeling the random occurrence of a cyber attack in 
reality. The cyber attacks here considered are sketched in Fig. 5 and hereafter 
described.  
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Condenser
Turbine
TL,cold
TL,hot
Gwater
kvhCR pSG
PTh
Tsteam
Water Pump
Attemperator
GattCore
Steam 
Generator
Header
Control System
Tsteam
pSG
TL,cold
PTh
kv
Gatt
Gwater
hCR
PI1
PI2
PI3
PI4
Tfeed
Feedforward
Turbine Admission Valve
Control Rods
PMech
Physical System
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Note:               - Sensor
                        - Cyber attackX
 
Fig. 5 Sketch of cyber attacks injected into the ALFRED system 
 (1) Sensors 
Controlled variables of the physical system are measured by sensors, whose 
values are fed to the control system. Four types of cyber attacks occurring at random 
time tA are considered for each sensor, preventing the controllers from receiving 
legitimate measurements (equivalent to typical Denial of Service (DoS) attacks 
(Zhang et al., 2016; Ding et al., 2016; Yuan et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2018; Zhu et al., 
2014)), mimicking stochastic failures (Boskvic and Mehra, 2002): (a) bias, (b) drift, 
(c) wider noise and (d) freezing (see dotted lines in Fig. 6 a), b), c) and d), 
respectively). The occurrence of any of these failure modes results in altered sensor 
measurements ysensor(t), as in Eq. (1): 
  
       
       
         
       
 
, 0, , 0, 0,
, 0, 0, ,
, , ,
, 0, , 1, ,
, ,
A A
sensor A A
A
sensor A A
y t t t N t normal
y t t b b t b t t t bias
y t y t t c t c t c t t t t drift
y t t t N t t wider noise
y t t t freezing
   


   
   

    

      
     

 
 
(1) 
where y(t) is the real value of the controlled variable y at time t, δ(t) is the nominal 
measuring error, distributed according to a normal distribution N(0,σ), b is a constant 
bias factor, c is a constant drift factor, δ’(t) is a wider measuring error, distributed 
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according to a normal distribution N(0,ασ) with a larger variance than δ(t) (α>1).  
 
(a) Bias
y(t)
Attack
0 tA t
(b) Drift
y(t)
Attack
0 tA t
y(t)
(c) Wider noise
Attack
0 tA t
y(t)
(d) Freezing
Attack
0 tA t
b
t
c(t)=c·(t-tA)yref yref
yref yref
b
ysensor(t)
ysensor(t)
ysensor(t)
ysensor(t)
 
Fig. 6. Sensor failure modes: (a) bias; (b) drift; (c) wider noise; and (d) freezing. Solid lines 
represent the real measurements of the controlled variables, whereas dotted lines are the altered 
measurements of the failed sensors 
 
Practically, the MC sampling procedure used to inject a random cyber attack to 
sensors at time tA consists in sampling the uncertain parameters b, c, δ’(t) from the 
distributions listed in Table 4 and, then, running the ALFRED simulator for collecting 
the controlled variables evolution throughout the mission time tM. Notice that 
Gaussian noises are typical of sensor data acquisition, leading to sensor nominal 
errors (column 2) and wider errors (column 5) under nominal condition and wider 
noise failure mode, respectively. Bias and drift (columns 3 and 4, respectively) are, 
instead, a-priori set from uniform distributions, to mimic sensor stochastic failures 
due to cyber attacks. 
 
Table 4 Parameters of sensors 
Sensor 
Nominal error 
δ(t) 
Failure factors 
Bias b Drift c Wider noise δ’(t) 
Tsteam (
oC) N(0,1) U(-200,200) U(-1,1) N(0,10) 
pSG (Pa) N(0,0.1) ·10
5
 U(-100,30) ·105 U(-0.2,0.2) ·105 N(0,2) ·105 
TL,cold (
oC) N(0,1) U(-30,30) U(-1,1) N(0,5) 
PTh (W) N(0,0.5) ·10
6
 U(-300,30) ·106 U(-0.5,0.5) ·106 N(0,0.7) ·106 
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(2) Actuators 
Three actuators of the digital I&C system of ALFRED are considered susceptible 
of a malicious attack, namely: control rods that regulate the rod heights hCR, water 
pump that regulates the feedwater mass flow rate Gwater and turbine admission valve 
kv that regulates the steam inlet mass flow rate. At nominal conditions, the actuators 
execute the command signals of the control system to respond to the sensors 
measurements and accommodate disturbances, transients or accidents. On the other 
hand, under attack, the actuators might fail stuck to a random magnitude of actuation 
A(t), here sampled from a uniform distribution (see Table 5): in this situation, the 
actuators would no longer receive proper control commands and the I&C system 
would not be capable of accommodating disturbances, transients or accidents, as 
shown in Fig. 7. 
 
Table 5 Parameters of actuators 
Actuator 
Regulated control 
variable 
Reference regulation Failure distribution 
Control rods hCR (cm) 12.3 U(0,64) 
Water pump Gwater (kg·s
-1) 192 U(0,300) 
Turbine admission 
valve coefficient 
kv (-) 1 U(1,1.5) 
 
A(t)
Aref
0 tA t
Attack
 
Fig. 7. Typical actuator-stuck failure 
 (3) PI controllers 
At nominal conditions, PI gains (i.e., Kp and Ki) and controlled variables set 
points yset,ref  are fixed by the control designers, to keep the physical process variables 
close to their nominal values. Under the cyber attack of Fig. 8, equivalent to a 
deception attack maliciously injecting a false message to the controller (Rahman et 
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al., 2016; Ding et al., 2016), PI gains and set points are randomly sampled from 
uniform distributions, covering all possible values (see Table 6). In terms of uniform 
distributions for sampling random values of PI gains (columns 6 and 7), their 
expectations are larger than the reference values, for increasing the possibility that the 
cyber attack impacts the system integrity (Di Maio et al., 2011). 
 
Table 6 Parameters of PIs 
PI 
Controlled 
variable, y 
Reference value PI parameter upon attack 
Kp,ref Ki,ref 
Set point, 
yset,ref 
Kp Ki Set point, yset 
PI1 Tsteam 1·10
-1 5·10-2 450 (oC) U(1·10-2,1) U(5·10-4,5) U(430,470) (oC) 
PI2 pSG 3·10
-7 1·10-8 180·105 (Pa) U(3·10-8,3·10-4) U(3·10-10,3·10-5) U(170,190) ·105 (Pa) 
PI3 TL,cold 6·10
-1 1·10-2 400 (oC) U(6·10-2,6) U(1·10-4,1) U(380,420) (oC) 
PI4 PTh 2·10
-11 4·10-11 300·106 (W) U(2·10-12,2·10-7) U(4·10-13,4·10-6) U(285,315) ·106 (W) 
 
Kp (Ki or yset)
Attack
0 tA t
Kp,ref (Ki,ref  or yset,ref)
 
Fig. 8 PI regulator failure due to the cyber attack 
 
It is worth mentioning that the components of the digital I&C system considered, 
their failure modes and cyber attack types are not intended to provide a 
comprehensive description of the system accidental behavior, but are only taken as 
exemplary for generating the dynamic accident scenarios to be processed for safety 
margins estimation, within the framework here proposed for the identification of the 
components most vulnerable to cyber threats. Moreover, we observe that an attacker 
is interested also in injecting “soft” failures that slowly drive the system into failure, 
rather than, only “hard” failures because the former is more difficult to detect and 
recover.  
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3. SAFETY MARGINS ESTIMATION FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF 
THE COMPONENTS MOST VULNERABLE TO CYBER THREATS 
A safety margin approach of literature (Zio et al., 2010; Di Maio et al., 2016b; Di 
Maio et al., 2017) is here originally used to estimate the extent of the consequences of 
cyber threats on the CPS components. 
 
3.1 Estimation of Safety Margins 
(1) One-sided safety margin 
Considering an accidental scenario a simulated over a mission time tM, the safety 
margin 𝑀𝑈,𝑦𝑎 of a safety parameter y, with respect to a predefined upper threshold Uy, 
is defined as the ratio between the computed value reached by the maximum value 
ymax,a during the accidental scenario and the design value yref  (see Fig. 9) (Nutt and 
Wallis, 2004; Di Maio et al., 2016b; Di Maio et al., 2017): 
 
max,
, max,
max,
max,
0
1
a
y a
U y ref a y
y ref
y a
a ref
U y
M y y U
U y
U y
y y

  



 
 
(2) 
ya(t)
yref
Uy
tM t
max,y aU y y refU y
ymax,a
 
Fig. 9 One-sided safety margin 𝑀𝑈,𝑦𝑎 
 
Being 𝑀𝑈,𝑦𝑎 a stochastic variable, the safety margin with respect to Uy (see Fig. 
10) is more rigorously defined as the difference between Uy and the value of a specific 
γ1 percentile of the distribution of the measured maximum values, 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎
𝛾1 , where 
?̂?𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎
𝛾1,𝛽1  (i.e., the estimate of 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎
𝛾1 ) is given  with confidence β1 (Lehmann and 
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Casella, 2006), viz: 
 
 
 
1
1 1 1
1 max, max,
,
1 max, max,
Pr
ˆPr
a a
a a
y y
y y

  


  

 
 (3) 
and, 
 
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
,
max,, ,
, max,
,
,
max,
,
max,
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ0
ˆ1
a
j a
U y ref a y
j j ref
y a
a ref
U y
M y y U
U y
U y
y y
 
   
 
 
 
  



 
 
(4) 
The value 1 1,max,ˆ ay
  is estimated by a Bracketing OS approach, which allows 
controlling the computational cost of the simulation codes and guarantees that the first 
element (out of N) in the descending sorted sample 1
max,ay  has a certain probability β1 
of exceeding the unknown true γ1 percentile. The number N can be calculated by Eq. 
(5), when γ1 and β1 are predefined. 
 1 11
N    (5) 
ya(t)
yref
Uy
γ1
β1
Mt
max, ia
y
1
max,ay

1 1,
max,
ˆ
ay
 
distributions
ya(t)
0 time
y refU y
1 1,
max,ˆy aU y


 1max,af y
 max,af y
 
Fig. 10. 
max, ia
y  obtained from N samples of the accidental scenario a used to estimate 1 1,max,ˆ ay
 , 
and, thus, to estimate 1 1,
, aU y
M
   
 
Similarly, the safety margin with respect to a lower threshold Ly becomes: 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
19 
 
 
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2
,
min,, ,
, min,
,
min,
,
min,
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ0
ˆ1
a
a y
L y y a ref
ref y
a y
ref a
y L
M L y y
y L
y L
y y
 
   
 
 
 
  



 
 
(6) 
where, 2 2,
min,
ˆ
ay
   is the point estimate value of the γ2 percentile of the distribution of the 
measured values 
min,ay , with a confidence β2, and, γ2 and β2 are: 
 
 
 
2
2 2 2
2 min, min,
,
2 min, min,
Pr
ˆPr
a a
a a
y y
y y

  


  

 
 (7) 
The number N can be calculated by Eq. (8), when γ2 and β2 are predefined. 
  2 21 1
N
     (8) 
(2) Two-sided safety margin 
The safety margin 𝑀𝑇,𝑦𝑎 of a safety parameter y with respect to the double-sided 
(both upper Uy and lower Ly) thresholds (see Fig. 11) is defined as the minimum value 
between 1 ,
, aU y
M
   and 2 ,
, aL y
M
   of Eqs. (4) and (6): 
  1 2 1 2, , , ,, , ,min ,a a aT y U y L yM M M
        (9) 
where, the number of the scenario samples N to be sorted can be calculated, when γ1, 
γ2 and β are predefined (Nutt and Wallis, 2004), according to Eq. (10): 
    1 2 1 21 1 1 1
NNN               (10) 
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ya(t)
Mt
Ly
γ1
β
1-γ2
β
yref
Uy
1
max,ay

1 1,
max,
ˆ
ay
 
2 2,
min,
ˆ
ay
 
2
min,ay

max, ia
y
min, ia
y
time
ya(t)
distributions
1 1,
max,ˆy aU y

 y refU y
yref
y L2 ,
min,
ˆ
ya
y L


 1max,af y
 max,af y
 min,af y
 2min,af y
 
Fig. 11. N pairs of maximum and minimum values of the accidental scenario are used to estimate 
1 ,
max,ˆ ay
  and 2
,
min,
ˆ
a
y

, and, thus, to estimate 
1 2, ,
, aT y
M
  
 
 
 
3.2 Cyber Threats Prioritization 
The responses of ALFRED to cyber attacks to sensors, actuators and PI 
regulators are investigated by simulation. From the simulations outcomes, safety 
margins of the four controlled variables (i.e., Tsteam, pSG, TL,cold, and PTh) are estimated, 
to quantify the effects of the cyber attacks on the system functionalities. A total of 
NT=29 runs of the ALFRED model are simulated, to satisfy the requirements of the 
percentiles estimations of the safety parameters by the Bracketing OS of Section 3.1, 
with respect to both one-sided (N=22, given i) γ1= 90
th, β1=90
th, or ii) γ2=10
th, β2=90
th) 
and two-sided (N=29, given γ1,= 90
th, γ2=10
th, β=90th) thresholds. Accordingly, N=22 
samples are randomly taken to estimate the safety margins of Tsteam (with respect to its 
upper threshold) and TL,cold (with respect to its lower threshold) and N=29 samples are 
used to estimate the safety margins of pSG and PTh (with respect to their two-sided 
thresholds). 
Effects of cyber attacks on the CPS components and on the system integrity are 
qualitatively ranked according to a three-level risk metric (see Table 7). Table 8 shows 
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the quantified design safety margins when the code is run 29 times under nominal 
conditions (proving that the system works with ample safety margins). 
 
Table 7 A three-level risk metric for ranking the effects of cyber attacks on the CPS 
Effect  
#1 #2
#3
orM  
Negligible [0.8, 1.0] 
Medium [0.2, 0.8) 
Severe [0.0, 0.2) 
  
Note: 1) #1 refers to “γ2,β2” for TL,cold, and to “γ2,β” for pSG and PTh;  
2) #2 refers to “γ1,β1” for Tsteam, and to “γ1,β” for pSG and PTh; 
3) #3 refers to “U,ya” for Tsteam, to L,ya for TL,cold, and to “T,ya” for pSG and PTh; 
4) γ1= 90
th, γ2=10
th, β1=90
th, β2=90
th, β=90th. 
 
Table 8 Safety margins estimation of the safety parameters under normal conditions 
Variable Tsteam (
oC) pSG (Pa) TL,cold (
oC) PTh (W) 
#1
min,
ˆ
ay
y  - 1.7967·107 396.1839 2.9819·108 
#2
max,
ˆ
ay
y  455.3330 1.8029·107 - 3.0181·108 
 #1 #2
#3
orM  0.9667 0.9672 0.9237 0.9396 
 
 
 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Sensors 
Table 9 presents the results of the safety margins estimation of the four types of 
failure modes of the four sensors measuring the values of the controlled variables, i.e., 
Tsteam, pSG, TL,cold, and PTh. 
 
Table 9 Safety margins estimation of the safety parameters of the cyber attacks to sensors 
Scenario a 1 1
,
,
, steam aU T
M    1 2
,
, ,
, SG aT p
M     2 2
, ,
,
, L cold aL T
M    1 2
,
, ,
, Th aT P
M     
Tsteam 
sensor 
bias 0.9562 0.9626 0.9350 0.9349 
drift 0.9604 0.9654 0.9188 0.9322 
wider noise 0.9579 0.9478 0.9195 0.9330 
freezing 0.9604 0.9654 0.9203 0.9374 
pSG sensor bias 0.8185 0 0.7776 0.8136 
drift 0.8701 0 0.9042 0.9335 
wider noise 0.9349 0.4098 0.9257 0.9220 
freezing 0.8988 0 0.9031 0.8600 
TL,cold 
sensor 
bias 0.5875 0.5787 0.5436 0.3838 
drift 0 0 0.5469 0 
wider noise 0.9138 0.9002 0.9085 0.9073 
freezing 0.2187 0.9722 0.6261 0.4707 
PTh sensor bias 0.9641 0 0.2342 0 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
22 
 
drift 0.9539 0.9662 0.8811 0 
wider noise 0.9601 0.9649 0.9212 0.9326 
freezing 0.9657 0.9645 0.9261 0.7672 
 
The results show that cyber attacks leading to Tsteam sensor failures do not affect 
the system functioning because all safety parameters are negligibly affected. System 
integrity can be affected by cyber attacks to the pSG, TL,cold and PTh sensors, directly 
resulting in large variations of the respective variables (attacks to PTh with a minor 
impact on the other controlled variables, whereas, cyber attacks to TL,cold sensor, e.g., 
bias, drift, or freezing, may impact the whole physical system). 
As example, Fig. 12 shows the evolution of the safety parameters when the TL,cold 
sensor is affected by the freezing failure mode. In all cases, the lead temperature at the 
SG outlet, TL,cold(t) deviates from its set point equal to 400
oC (Fig. 12(a)), due to the 
PI3 response to the frozen value TL,cold,sensor(t). Then, the steam SG outlet temperature 
Tsteam changes accordingly to the change of the lead temperature (Fig. 12(b)), causing 
the change of Thermal power PTh (Fig. 12(d)). SG pressure change (Fig. 12(c)) is 
negligible thanks to the effective regulation of the steam mass flow rate by the turbine 
admission valve. These alterations are well caught by the safety margin analysis. In 
particular, the safety margin of Tsteam, TL,cold, and PTh  in case of TL,cold sensor freezing 
(Table 10) result to be equal to 0.2187, 0.6260, and 0.4707, respectively. This 
corresponds to a “medium” effect, according to the predefined risk metric of Table 7. 
On the other hand, SG Pressure is kept approximately at the nominal level with little 
disturbances, and, thus, “negligibly” affected by the cyber attacks. 
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Fig. 12. Profiles of the safety parameters for NT=29 runs, when TL,cold sensor is frozen: (a) 
evolution of lead temperature in the cold leg; (b) evolution of steam SG output temperature; (c) 
evolution of SG pressure; and (d) evolution of reactor thermal power 
 
Table 10 Safety margins estimation of the safety parameters of TL,cold sensor freezing cyber 
attack scenarios 
Variable Tsteam (
oC) pSG (Pa) TL,cold (
oC) PTh (W) 
#1
min,
ˆ
ay
y  - 1.7972·107 381.3042 2.8412·108 
#2
max,
ˆ
ay
y  528.1336 1.8026·107 - 3.0391·108 
 #1 #2
#3
orM  0.2187 0.9722 0.6260 0.4707 
Note: 1) a in this Table refers to TL,cold sensor freezing, denoting that the simulation is run to simulate 
the system dynamic scenario processing when the TL,cold sensor is attacked to freezing and, to test the 
effects of such cyber attacks on the system integrity. 
 
4.2 Actuators 
The results of the safety margins estimation of the three actuator failures are 
shown in Table 11. The cyber attacks leading to actuator-stuck failure at a random 
output level, severely affect the system functioning and integrity since most of the 
safety margins of the parameters turn out to be less than 0.2. This evidence should 
raise defenders’ concern, because the ALFRED dynamics would be severely affected 
if cyber breaches are injected into these vulnerable components. 
 
Table 11 Safety margins estimation of the safety parameters of the cyber attacks to actuators 
Scenario a 1 1
,
,
, steam aU T
M    1 2
,
, ,
, SG aT p
M     2 2
, ,
,
, L cold aL T
M    1 2
,
, ,
, Th aT P
M     
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CR height stuck 0.4895 0 0.7532 0 
Water pump stuck 0 0 0.5441 0 
Turbine valve stuck 0.1708 0 0.8484 0.1792 
 
As illustrative example, Fig. 13 shows the evolution of the safety parameters 
when the water pump is attacked to fail stuck with a random value sampled from the 
uniform distribution in U(0,300) mentioned in Table 5, at a random time tA. The 
feedwater mass flow rate Gwater is output at a constant value in each case and this 
directly affects the SG performance. As a result, the lead temperature at the SG outlet 
TL,cold (Fig. 13(a)) and steam SG outlet temperature Tsteam (Fig. 13(b)) are strongly 
affected. Then, changes in Tsteam cause transients of SG pressure (Fig. 13(c)), and, at 
the same time, TL,cold causes the CRs regulation that affects the reactor thermal power 
PTh (Fig. 13(d)). The results are shown in Table 12. Regarding the lower threshold, the 
safety margin of TL,cold turns out to be 0.5441, classified as a “medium” effect, 
according to three-level risk metric of Table 7. On the other hand, all safety margins 
of Tsteam, pSG, and PTh, result to be equal to 0, indicating that a cyber attack to the 
water pump-stuck would “severely” affect the system dynamics and integrity.  
 
  
Fig. 13 Profiles of the safety parameters for NT=29 runs, when the water pump is attacked to fail 
stuck with a random value: (a) evolution of lead temperature in the cold leg; (b) evolution of 
steam SG output temperature; (c) evolution of SG pressure; and (d) evolution of thermal power 
Table 12 Safety margins estimation of the safety parameters of water pump-stuck 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
25 
 
cyber attack scenarios 
Variable Tsteam (
oC) pSG (Pa) TL,cold (
oC) PTh (W) 
#1
min,
ˆ
ay
y  - 1.6089·107 377.2037 2.0677·108 
#2
max,
ˆ
ay
y  715.0707 1.8712·107 - 3.1242·108 
 #1 #2
#3
orM  0 0 0.5441 0 
Note: 1) a in this Table refers to water pump-stuck, denoting that the simulation is run to test the system 
dynamic scenario processing when the water pump is attacked to get stuck in a random value and, to 
test the effects of such cyber attacks on the system integrity. 
 
4.3 PI Controllers 
The safety margins estimation results of cyber attacks to PI gains and set points 
are presented in Table 13. Cyber attacks to change of PI gain values have negligible 
effects on the safety parameters and on the system functionalities (except for changes 
of the Kp value of PI3). This is potentially ascribed to the PI controller capability of 
regulating the errors of controlled variables close to zero even if the (relative small) 
gain values are changed to 3 or 4 orders of magnitude larger than the reference 
settings. On the other hand, cyber attacks changing the controllers set point values 
(i.e., pSG,set, TL,cold,set, PTh,set) are more likely to cause system performance degradation. 
Such evidences demonstrate that PI gain values play a less important role, compared 
with the residual between the measurement and the set point value, e(t). 
 
Table 13 Safety margins estimation of the safety parameters of the cyber attacks to 
PI regulator value changes 
Scenario a 1 1
,
,
, steam aU T
M    1 2
,
, ,
, SG aT p
M     2 2
, ,
,
, L cold aL T
M    1 2
,
, ,
, Th aT P
M     
PI1  Kp  0.9676 0.9696 0.9203 0.9355 
Ki  0.9624 0.9698 0.9219 0.9232 
Tsteam,set 0.9534 0.9591 0.9263 0.9295 
PI2  Kp  0.9612 0.9722 0.9304 0.9321 
Ki  0.9677 0.9684 0.9213 0.9370 
pSG,set 0.9647 0.0213 0.9260 0.9300 
PI3  Kp  0.9451 0.7570 0.9156 0.8981 
Ki  0.9677 0.9660 0.9199 0.9414 
TL,cold,set 0.6879 0.8840 0.5739 0.6264 
PI4  Kp  0.9623 0.9671 0.9168 0.9287 
Ki  0.9657 0.9699 0.9187 0.9343 
PTh,set 0.9655 0.9685 0.9120 0.4628 
 
 
Fig. 14 shows the evolution of the safety parameters when the reference value of 
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Kp of PI1 is attacked at a random time tA and changes to a random value distributed as 
U(1e-2,1) (see Table 6). 
Under such circumstances, the steam SG outlet temperature Tsteam (Fig. 14(a)) is 
negligibly affected. The most probable reason is that Kp plays a less important role in 
PI computation, compared with the residual between the measurement Tsteam and the 
set point value Tsteam,set, e(t). The resulting negligible change of Tsteam will not lead to 
any transients of SG functioning. Also, the evolutions of SG pressure pSG (Fig. 14(b)), 
of lead temperature at the SG outlet TL,cold (Fig. 14(c)), and of reactor thermal power 
PTh (Fig. 14(d)) are not altered with respect to normal conditions. Safety margins of 
Tsteam, pSG, TL,cold and PTh result to be equal to 0.9676, 0.9696, 0.9203, and 0.9355, 
respectively. 
 
  
Fig. 14 Profiles of the safety parameters for NT=29 runs, when the PI1 Kp gain is changed to a 
random value: (a) evolution of steam SG output temperature; (b) evolution of SG pressure; (c) 
evolution of lead temperature in the cold leg; and (d) evolution of reactor thermal power 
 
Table 14 Safety margins estimation of the safety parameters of change of Kp value of 
PI1 cyber attack scenarios 
Variable Tsteam (
oC) pSG (Pa) TL,cold (
oC) PTh (W) 
#1
min,
ˆ
ay
y  - 1.7971·107 396.0125 2.9809·108 
#2
max,
ˆ
ay
y  453.2381 1.8030·107 - 3.0193·108 
 #1 #2
#3
orM  0.9676 0.9696 0.9203 0.9355 
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Note: 1) a in this Table refers to change of Kp value of PI1, denoting that the simulation is run to test the 
system dynamic scenario processing when the Kp gain value of PI1 is attacked to be changed to a 
random value and, to test the effects of such cyber attacks on the system integrity. 
 
4.4 Multiple Cyber Attacks to PI Controllers 
Coupling of malicious alteration of PI gain values and set points are hereafter 
considered, being expected to lead to more severe effects on the PI performance and, 
therefore, on the system safety, rather than the single failure modes considered in 
Section 4.3. In each simulation run, the PI gain value and the controlled variable set 
point value are both attacked at a random time tA, within the mission time of tM. Thus, 
eight types of the multiple cyber attack scenarios are considered (see Table 15 first 
two columns).  
Results are shown in Table 15. Except for the cyber attacks to PI1 resulting in 
negligible effects, the scenarios originated by attacks to PI2, PI3 and PI4 would result 
in more severe impacts on the safety parameters and the system functionality, 
compared with single cyber attacks of PIs of Table 13. The evidence entails further 
concerns on the protection design of multiple cyber attack scenarios, for optimizing 
the cyber defense strategies from the perspective of the defenders. 
 
Table 15 Safety margins estimation of the safety parameters of the sequence of 
multiple cyber attacks to PI regulators 
Scenario a 
1 1,
, _ aU T steam
M
 
 
1 2, ,
, aT Pressure
M
    
2 2,
, _ _ aL T cold leg
M
 
 
1 2, ,
, _ aT Th power
M
  
 
PI1 Kp & Tsteam,set 0.9562 0.9560 0.9246 0.9373 
Ki & Tsteam,set 0.9590 0.9607 0.9134 0.9352 
PI2 Kp & pSG,set 0.9670 0 0.9224 0.9203 
Ki & pSG,set 0.9628 0.0566 0.9200 0.9342 
PI3 Kp & TL,cold,set 0.6182 0.2687 0.6300 0.4196 
Ki & TL,cold,set 0.7991 0.8850 0.5872 0.5840 
PI4 Kp & PTh,set 0.8170 0.4819 0.8355 0 
Ki & PTh,set 0.9675 0.9719 0.9195 0.5201 
 
4.5 Comments 
The results of the single failure modes of Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 suggest 
insightful recommendations. On one hand, the cyber attacks to actuators (control rod 
height, water pump and turbine coefficient valve) seem to be the most worrying for 
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the entire system functionality and integrity. The effect of the attacks to the pSG and 
PTh sensors are limited to the secondary and primary circuits, respectively, making 
them less problematic. The situation is different if the attack involves the TL,cold 
sensor, since the whole system is affected by a departure from the nominal values, 
underlying once again the relevance of the lead temperature control. Functionality of 
the ALFRED reactor will be negligibly affected, if attackers access the Tsteam sensor 
database or the values of PI gains. As a last remark, it is important to point out that 
multiple cyber attacks originated by the coupled alteration of gain values and set 
points, discussed in Section 4.4, raise further concerns on protection design decision-
making for counteracting cyber threats, compared with single failure modes of 
controllers.  
We conclude by noting that, in practice, modality, timing and sequencing of 
cyber attacks are less predictable than stochastic failures, making the identification of 
the most vulnerable components to cyber threats an issue of outmost importance for 
protection design. Optimal protection design strategies have to be considered also on 
the basis of cyber threats prioritization, on one hand and, on the other hand, a trade-
off between safety. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we have proposed a Monte Carlo-based exploration framework for 
generating cyber attack scenarios in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) and accounting 
for multiple failure modes of attacked components of the CPSs, to test the effects of 
the cyber threats on the system functionality and integrity, and to prioritize the most 
vulnerable components for cyber security protection decision-making. 
A safety margin estimation approach has been proposed for cyber threat 
prioritization. Safety margins of the safety parameters are estimated by a Bracketing 
OS approach, with respect to the one- and two-sided thresholds.  
We have taken the digital I&C system of the Advanced Lead-cooled Fast Reactor 
European Demonstrator (ALFRED) as case study, in which cyber breach events 
aiming at attacking the embedded CPS components are injected by a Monte Carlo 
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sampling procedure, at random times and of random magnitudes. The results of the 
case study identify actuators as the most vulnerable CPS components, their failures 
leading more easily to the loss of system functionality and integrity, along with the 
lead temperature sensor, which is relevant component for the control of the 
temperature lead in the cold pool.  
With due caution, in future works we seek to accommodate the notion of 
probabilistic safety margin assessment (Di Maio et al., 2016b; Grabaskas et al., 2015; 
Zio et al., 2008) to encompass the explorative characteristics of the here proposed 
framework and the underlying (if any) probabilistic distributions behind cyber attacks 
and attackers behaviors. Besides, other future works will regard, on one hand, the 
development of both statistical and dynamic scenario processing methods with the 
purpose of distinguishing between cyber attacks and stochastic failures, and, on the 
other hand, modeling possible attack strategies considering factors such as 
frequencies of occurrence, component compromise probabilities, attack costs, etc., 
and optimizing defense countermeasures, considering factors such as economics loss 
and defense costs. Both single and multiple cyber attack scenarios will be considered 
in these future works. In particular, a special concern is to model the effects of cyber 
attacks on the power grid, with reference to the therein transferred mechanical power, 
since the stability of plant power production plays an important role in maintaining 
functionality and integrity of the complex power infrastructure, where the NPP is 
functionally located. 
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